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Financial risky decisions and evaluations pervade many human everyday activities.
Scientific research in such decision-making typically explores the influence of socio-
economic and cognitive factors on financial behavior. However, very little research
has explored the holistic influence of contextual, emotional, and hormonal factors on
preferences for risk in insurance and investment behaviors. Accordingly, the goal of this
review article is to address the complexity of individual risky behavior and its underlying
psychological factors, as well as to critically examine current regulations on financial
behavior.
Keywords: decision-making, risky behavior, risky context, risky content, cognitive factors, emotional and
hormonal factors
HOW DO COGNITIONS AND EMOTIONS INFLUENCE RISKY
BEHAVIOR
Theories of judgements and decision-making have explored the inﬂuence of economic and
psychological factors on risky behavior. However, very little research has oﬀered a holistic
exploration of the inﬂuence of contextual, content, emotional, and hormonal factors on preferences
for risk in insurance and investment behaviors. Moreover, in this review article, we aimed
to address this gap: we oﬀered evidence that these factors have an independent inﬂuence
on preference formation and behavior under risk. Accordingly, our review highlights a need
to investigate how variation in these factors produces variation in decision-making under
risk.
Utilitarian Expectations and Decision Norms
Non-psychological (e.g., economic) norms, rules and regulations are the expected decision
environment of any human ﬁnancial behavior. Thus, human decision agents are (i) expected to
act ‘normatively’ and make rational decisions, and (ii) evaluate and assess according to normative
criteria and utilitarian expectations. These expectations are quite often unrealistic, as human
agency (psychological processing and behavior) is assessed and measured with externally designed
economic tools (e.g., rational norms and rules), which typically do not include psychological
parameters (e.g., Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). In this article, we summarize theoretical
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and empirical evidence for the role of several major psychological
and biological factors inﬂuencing human agency, expected
normative acts and respective behavioral outcomes.
According to normative (economics) and descriptive
(psychology) theories of decision-making (e.g., Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1947; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) human
decision-making behavior is informed by computational
integrations of attributes such as probabilities and money (in a
decision-making context). Furthermore, human agents engaging
in ﬁnancial behaviors (e.g., investment and protective) are
supposed to obey normative expectations by performing utility
trade-oﬀs between the computed outputs (psycho-economic
variables such as expected values) and certain monetary
alternatives (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992). A rational decision-maker must choose the
alternative with the highest utility, independent of decision-
making context (i.e., verbal presentation and description).
Crucially, normative theory implies that any information not
pertinent to calculating the expected values of the options should
not inﬂuence the choices.
Risky Behavior: The Role of Decision
Context, Content, and Experience
In many studies measuring human risky preferences the
respondents are typically invited to make a decision, which
involves a choice between a probabilistic/uncertain option (such
as 50% chance of winning £4000) and a sure option (certain
win of £2000). For example, based on tasks with hypothetical
monetary gambles, prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman,
1992) predicts that two psychological parameters (contextual loss
and gain framing and probability levels employed in the gamble)
underlie human risky decisions. However, recent research (Kusev
et al., 2009, 2012, 2016; Vlaev et al., 2010; Kusev and van
Schaik, 2011) explored the role of memory and decision-making
content on risky decisions. These experiments (Kusev et al.,
2009) demonstrated that the behavioral eﬀects of decision-
making content (type of utility and associated memory) are
independent of that of context (e.g., textual summaries and
descriptions). Speciﬁcally, diﬀerences in contextual descriptions
of risk (e.g., probability levels), monetary amounts, as well
as accessibility to decision-making content (e.g., vividness of
events in memory and activated emotions) alter respondents’
risk preferences and choices (e.g., Slovic, 1987; Kusev et al.,
2009; see also Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Tversky and
Wakker, 1995). Furthermore, theorists have argued that the
particular combination of contextual factors, accessibility to
content of decision-making utility, task type and demands,
and computational skills trigger a particular type of behavioral
response – normatively rational or irrational risky behavior (e.g.,
Kusev and van Schaik, 2011).
It is also well established that human agents experience
decision-making information rather than relying on descriptions
of decision-making information. For example, risky events in
the real world are experienced sequentially and often without
contextual summaries (Hertwig et al., 2004; Stewart et al.,
2006; Kusev et al., in press). However, some risky events
are not experienced individually over time, but are reviewed
retrospectively and can also immediately be inspected holistically
as with learning about decisions from descriptions (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1992). Nevertheless, with both decision-making
experiences agents refer to exactly the same utilitarian data
before expressing their risk preferences. For example, research in
insurance decision-making (Kusev et al., 2009) revealed that both
decisions from experience and descriptions have an independent
inﬂuence on risk preference. People’s experiences of events
leak into decisions even when normative risk information is
explicitly provided (Kusev et al., 2009). Speciﬁcally, respondents
exaggerated the risk for accessible utilitarian events in memory,
indicating that variation in decision content produces variation
in preferences for risk (Kusev et al., 2009; Kusev and van Schaik,
2011).
Insurance decisions and other precautionary behaviors are
aimed at minimizing or avoiding risk. Typically the beneﬁts
of taking precautionary actions exemplify risk-averse behavior
(Hershey and Schoemaker, 1980; Kusev et al., 2009). Health-
related insurance behavior and private long-term care insurance
are of particular interest for policy makers and the general
public. Results from a recent survey on retirement-planning
behavior revealed that emotions might be important predictors
of long-term care insurance purchase intentions (Tennyson
and Kyung Yang, 2014). More speciﬁcally, it was found that
respondents for whom family is a greater source of life
satisfaction express higher purchase intentions. The authors
suggest that strong emotional ties with the family may lead
to a stronger desire to prevent burdening them with long-
term care responsibilities (Tennyson and Kyung Yang, 2014).
Respondents’ willingness and decisions to buy insurance are
not inﬂuenced only by cognitive or economic factors, but
also emotional factors come into play and in the following
section we provide empirical arguments to support this
claim.
Emotions and Emotion Regulation
Strategies in Risky Behavior
In this section, we will focus on the eﬀects of emotions
on decision-making. Namely, some of the most inﬂuential
theoretical and empirical perspectives on the complex
interactions between aﬀective processes and decision processes
will be reviewed, followed by applications in insurance and
investment decisions. In the last part of this section, we will
introduce the concept of emotion regulation (ER) and present
recent studies looking into the eﬀects of the mechanisms people
use to control emotions on their decision performance.
While mainstream economics tends to employ axiomatic
normative assumptions about decision agency, research evidence
from psychology and neuroscience provide strong empirical
support for the eﬀects of human emotions on risky behavior (e.g.,
Gilbert, 2007; Cris˛an et al., 2009; Guven, 2012; Heilman, 2014;
Heilman et al., 2016). The main eﬀorts in the studies of emotion-
decision interaction are in understanding the role of emotions
in decision-making (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003; Damasio,
2005), and their neural underpinnings (Panksepp, 1998).
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Several models and theories on the emotion-decision
processes interplay attempt to explain and predict the decision
consequences of aﬀective factors. Loewenstein and Lerner
(2003) present a systematization of possible interactions between
emotions and decision-making. One important theoretical
contribution suggested by these authors is the classiﬁcation of
emotions as immediate or anticipated emotions. Anticipated
emotions refer to the emotions people expect to feel as a
consequence of choosing one decision alternative over another.
Expected utility theory or other consequentialist models assume
that people predict utilitarian and emotional consequences
(associated with choice options), and choose the option that
maximizes positive emotions and minimizes negative emotions.
In contrast, immediate emotions include all aﬀective states
that the decision-maker has at the time of the decision. These
immediate emotions can be directly related to the decision
context. For example, when a person experiences anxiety in front
of a risky situation, or indirectly, when the decision-maker feels
happy, and more optimistic about positive outcomes of a risky
decision (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). Notably, in the last few
decades, economists have chieﬂy been preoccupied with studying
anticipated emotions, such as regret and disappointment
(Loomes and Sugden, 1982), whereas psychologists have focused
on immediate emotions (Loewenstein, 2000).
Since the publication of Loewenstein and Lerner’s (2003)
work, numerous studies have explored the eﬀects of anticipated
and immediate emotions on a large variety of decision tasks and
contexts. Examples are in behavioral risk-taking and perception
of risk (e.g., Slovic et al., 2004; Damasio, 2005; Miu et al.,
2008), judgements of happiness and overall satisfaction with
life (Schwarz and Clore, 1983), consumer decision-making and
the endowment eﬀect (Lerner et al., 2004; Han et al., 2007), as
well as implications of social mood and individual diﬀerences in
stockmarket indexes and other ﬁnancial outcomes (Olson, 2006).
Accordingly, there has been ongoing debate about which emotion
category has more inﬂuence on risky behavior. For instance,
Schlösser et al. (2013), oﬀered strong empirical support for the
claim that immediate emotions predict risky decisions, beyond
the eﬀects of anticipated emotions or the subjective probability
attached to outcomes. In a similar vein, Grable and Roszkowski
(2008) showed that decision-makers in a happy mood have
higher levels of ﬁnancial risk tolerance, holding bio-psychosocial
and environmental factors constant. Using a mood induction
procedure, Stanton et al. (2014) reported that a happy mood
induction increased risk-seeking behavior compared to neutral
mood, whereas a sad mood induction procedure did not induce
behavioral diﬀerences in comparison to neutral mood.
However, the existing literature provides a mixed image
regarding the eﬀects of positive and negative moods or aﬀective
states. For instance, positive emotional states are associated
with increased problem solving capacity (Isen, 1984, 1987,
1993), remembering positive events (Bower, 1981), increased
risk-taking (Kahn and Isen, 1993), and optimism toward the
possibility of living positive events in the future (Wright and
Bower, 1992; Nygren et al., 1996). Other studies have linked
positive mood or emotional states to reduced risk-taking. For
instance, Isen and Patrick (1983) put forward the “mood
maintenance theory” which states that people in happy moods are
more reluctant to take risks since they don’t want to undermine
their positive emotional state (Isen et al., 1988).
On the other hand, negative aﬀective states were shown to
predispose individuals toward remembering negative past events
(Bower, 1981) as well as overestimating the chances of a negative
event in the future (Johnson and Tversky, 1983). Consensus in
the scientiﬁc literature regarding the eﬀects of negative emotions
on risk-taking is also lacking. Whereas some papers documented
the fact that experimentally induced negative emotions as well as
anxious and depressive states lead tomore risk-averse preferences
(Leith and Baumeister, 1996; Yuen and Lee, 2003;Miu et al., 2008;
Heilman et al., 2010), other authors provide empirical evidence
supporting a positive relation between negative emotions and
risk-taking (Mittal and Ross, 1998; Raghunathan and Pham,
1999; Bruyneel et al., 2009).
As reviewed in the preceding paragraphs, most theories and
empirical studies of aﬀective inﬂuences on decisional processes
have contrasted the eﬀects of positive emotions on decision-
making with the eﬀects of negative emotions. These studies
started from the assumption that all positive emotions and
all negative emotions, respectively, should have similar impact
on decision-making in general, or risk-taking, in particular.
However, as previously reviewed, behavioral data regarding
aﬀective inﬂuences on risk-taking are less consistent. Lerner
and Keltner (2000, 2001) proposed the “appraisal tendency
hypothesis” to address this issue. Their theory asserts that each
emotion is associated with a speciﬁc appraisal dimension, which,
in turn, will determine the inﬂuence of speciﬁc emotions on
judgements and decisions. For instance, based on Lerner and
Keltner’s (2000, 2001) results, induced fear was associated with
pessimistic judgements of future events and risk-averse choices,
whereas induced anger was associated with more optimistic
judgements and a more risk-seeking behavioral pattern. In
conclusion, appraisals of certainty and control moderate and/or
mediate emotional eﬀects on risk-taking. Taking appraisal
dimensions of same-valence emotions into account might
eliminate some of the inconsistency in previously reported
results.
Looking speciﬁcally at ﬁnancial decision-making, there are
several studies that unravel the complex dynamics between
emotions and risky decisions. Van Winden et al. (2011) observed
that the timing of the resolution of risk (the time that passes
between the risky decision and the consequences of that decision)
and anticipatory emotions predicted investment behavior.
Delaying the resolution, for negative anticipatory emotions
(with high-probability success) discouraged investment behavior,
whereas delaying the resolution for positive anticipatory
emotions (with low-probability success) encouraged the
investment behavior. Similarly, Gambetti and Giusberti (2012)
argued that trait anxiety predicts low-risk investment decisions,
whereas trait anger is associated with higher ﬁnancial risk-taking.
In addition, experimental ﬁndings (Guven, 2012) revealed that
happier people spend less, and are (i) less likely to have debts,
(ii) more concerned about the future and thus save more money.
Likewise, consumer behavior is also inﬂuenced by aﬀective
states: a study conducted by Cryder et al. (2008) showed that
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people tend to spend more money when they are in a sad
mood.
With regard to precautionary behavior, experimental results
have shown that buying insurance is more attractive for
items with aﬀective descriptions inducing participants’ fear of
losing the items (Petrova et al., 2014). Accordingly, a survey
study, analyzing data from UK households who either had
experienced ﬂooding or who were at risk of ﬂooding, found that
people’s protective decisions were inﬂuenced more by anticipated
negative emotions, such as anxiety or insecurity, than by material
and ﬁnancial considerations (Harries, 2012). If the decision to
insure against ﬂooding is partly determined by aﬀective reactions
and experience, more research should be carried on in this area,
in order to inform better public policy.
However, there is evidence that people employ regulation
strategies designed to alter their emotional reactions. Under
optimal circumstances, the success of regulatory strategy assures
a good emotional and social functioning of the individual.
Nevertheless, when ER mechanisms are malfunctioning, they
can increase the risk for developing symptoms of psychiatric
disorders (Davidson et al., 2000; Phillips, 2003). One of the most
inﬂuential approaches in the study of emotion and ER is the
process model of emotions (Gross, 1998, 2002). ER is a construct
that subsumes all the actions that people take in order to control
which emotions they have, when they have them and how they
experience or express those emotions (Gross, 2002).
One ER strategy that has received particular attention is
cognitive reappraisal (Gross, 2002; Ochsner and Gross, 2007;
Siemer et al., 2007). This strategy implies that changing the
situation’s meaning alters its emotional impact. In contrast,
the ER strategy of expressive suppression involves inhibiting
ongoing emotion-expressive behaviors (Gross, 1998; Ochsner
and Gross, 2007). Individual diﬀerences in habitual use of ER
strategies (i.e., cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression)
have been associated with eﬀects on aﬀective, social, and cognitive
functioning of the individual, physiological changes or even
psychological well-being (John and Gross, 2004).
Because of the eﬀectiveness of ER strategies, it is possible
that these strategies might, in fact, moderate the involvement
of emotions in ﬁnancial decision-making. Most of the previous
studies on emotion and decision-making have not controlled
for ER. Therefore, the eﬀects of ER on ﬁnancial decision-
making, ranging from ‘coloring’ the content of thoughts to
interfering with information processing and context (previously
attributed to acute emotions) might actually be moderated by ER
strategies such as cognitive reappraisal or expressive suppression.
Only recently, however, have scholars begun to investigate
these possibilities, and in doing so they have discovered that
ER can indeed moderate the eﬀects that task and incidental
emotions have on decisions (Heilman, 2006, 2014; Kahneman
and Frederick, 2007; Heilman et al., 2010; Miu and Crisan, 2011;
Heilman and Miclea, 2015; Szasz et al., 2016).
Psychologists and economists investigating risky behavior
should be interested in understanding how and in what contexts
emotions inﬂuence risky attitudes and behavior. Moreover, how
can these emotions be eﬃciently controlled, in order to reach
the utilitarian beneﬁcial decision outcomes (e.g., the option with
the highest utility overall)? Although much has been written
about neurotransmitters (e.g., dopamine, Norbury and Husain,
2015) in relation to risk, a critical area that, until recently, has
been relatively neglected by psychologists and economists is
the hormonal underpinning of risk. Hormones are particularly
relevant to understanding context-speciﬁcity, given that some of
their blood levels can vary according to context and some of their
eﬀects are transient and short-lasting (e.g., Resko and Eik-Nes,
1966; Ditzen et al., 2009). The following section gives an overview
of the hormonal predictors of risk-taking.
HORMONAL PREDICTORS OF
RISK-TAKING
Hormonal Correlates of Changes in
Environment
Cortisol is known as the stress hormone, with higher levels
reﬂecting increased amounts of stress and lower psychological
well-being (e.g., Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004). Dickerson
and Kemeny (2004) highlighted that the relationships between
a number of putative psychological stressors and cortisol
levels have not been consistently established in the literature.
The hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenocortical (HPA) network is
triggered by the release of corticotrophin-releasing hormone, in
turn stimulating release of adrenocorticotropin hormone from
the anterior pituitary, ﬁnally causing secretion of cortisol into the
bloodstream from the adrenal cortex (e.g., Sapolsky et al., 2000).
The activation of the HPA network has been associated with a
range of psychological changes, most notably stress (e.g., Selye,
1956).
A common formulation is that the adrenocortical system is
activated by circumstances in which the individual is prevented
from pursuing goals, or where those goals are otherwise
threatened (Carver and Scheier, 1999). Within this framework,
in which the individual’s motivation is central, stress is triggered
because of the adaptive relevance of interference with goals.
Basic threats to one’s survival or safety elicit release of cortisol
from the HPA network, serving an adaptive purpose, given
that cortisol augments the bioavailability of energy for ﬁght
or ﬂight, amongst other associated physiological optimisations
for survival-relevant behaviors (Lovallo and Thomas, 2000).
Although such self-preservatory threats are generally considered
the archetypal conditions that stimulate cortisol release (Sapolsky
et al., 2000), the literature indicates that threats to other, more
human-speciﬁc, goals are also associated with raised levels of
cortisol.
Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) describe the ‘social self-
preservation system,’ which functions to monitor the
environment for threats to the individual’s social status or
self-esteem. In line with this idea, the availability of social
support has been associated with a reduced level of cortisol,
as indexed by salivary assay (Kirschbaum et al., 1995), and a
metanalysis by Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) indicated that
cortisol responses were markedly augmented under conditions of
social-evaluative threat. Some more recent work has broadened
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this research area to include the interactions of cortisol with
another neurotransmitter, oxytocin, which is associated with
trust and social acceptance.
Oxytocin aﬀects the extent to which we feel trust toward
others, with higher levels associated with increased trust (Zak
et al., 2004; Kosfeld et al., 2005). Its release is not under
deliberate conscious control, but is determined by physiological,
social, and organizational conditions (e.g., Zak et al., 2004).
Cortisol suppresses oxytocin, thereby directly reducing feelings
of interpersonal trust, whereas oxytocin reduces cortisol levels
(Ditzen et al., 2009).
Oxytocin is not just a correlate of well-being, but a direct
cause of it, as shown by a number of studies, involving intranasal
administration of the neuromodulator (e.g., Ditzen et al., 2009;
Van IJzendoorn et al., 2012), which can demonstrably reduce
the production of cortisol (Cardoso et al., 2013). For example,
a study by Cardoso et al. (2013) demonstrated that intranasal
administration of oxytocin attenuated cortisol level relative to
placebo, although it should be noted that mood itself – the
psychological instantiation of stress – was not aﬀected by this
manipulation. In another study, however, by Heinrichs et al.
(2003), a combination of social support and intranasal oxytocin
demonstrably lowered salivary cortisol, but also both decreased
anxiety and increased calmness.
Other steroid hormones beside cortisol (estrogen and
progesterone) also play an important role in human physiology
throughout the life course and can be reliably measured in
saliva, with careful assessment of timing in the menstrual cycle
(Gavrilova and Lindau, 2009). Progesterone, estrogen, and the
adrenal-stress hormones (such as cortisol) are intimately linked
(Edwards and Mills, 2008). Stress knocks the hormonal patterns
out of rhythm and also places a greater demand on the body’s
nutrient reserves, leading to tiredness and a vicious circle of
feeling less able to cope with stress. Estrogen has been shown to
increase non-reproductive behaviours in mice, including anxiety,
fear, and physical activity level (running; Morgan and Pfaﬀ,
2001). Progesterone plays an important role in brain function
and is often called the “feel-good hormone” because of its mood
enhancing and antidepressant eﬀects (Wierman, 2007).
Hormonal Response to Challenges, Risk,
and Ambiguity
Cortisol has recently been implicated in accounts of ﬂuctuations
in risk-taking behavior. Coates and Herbert (2008) investigated
the impact of market volatility – entailing a lack of informational
availability, or ambiguity – on a population of traders in the City
of London, ﬁnding that the traders underwent a 68% increase
in average cortisol levels as market volatility increased over a
period of around 1 week, in addition to a markedly higher level
of cortisol in the afternoon relative to those measured in the
mornings which was the result of an increase in sustained eﬀort
and expected challenge. Such chronic and acute raised cortisol
levels appear to have rather diﬀerent eﬀects on the cognitive
system: acute increases are associated with higher motivation and
more sensation-seeking (Piazza et al., 1993; Putman et al., 2010),
whereas chronic raised cortisol level has been linked to impaired
executive (attention) control (Liston et al., 2009), and appears to
cause or exacerbate both anxiety (Korte, 2001) and depression
(Sapolsky, 2000).
Kandasamy et al. (2014) hypothesized that, on the above basis,
acutely raised cortisol would, if anything, increase risk-taking
behavior, whereas chronic augmentation of cortisol would lead
to risk aversion. In a double-blind, placebo-controlled, crossover,
randomized trial involving 36 people over an 8-day period,
participants’ risk preferences were measured using a series of
computer tasks. Cortisol level was both acutely and chronically
raised by administration of hydrocortisone, a pharmaceutical
variant of cortisol. In line with the authors’ predictions, ﬁnancial
risk-taking was not reliably aﬀected by acute elevation of
cortisol, but was reduced by sustained elevation. Speciﬁcally,
with chronic elevation of cortisol, participants opted for bets
with lower variance and also lower expected returns. This
ﬁnding is illustrative in calling into question the widely adopted
assumption that the utility functions underlying risk preferences
are unchanging through time (e.g., see Kusev et al., 2009, for a
detailed questioning of such assumptions).
In addition to investigating the role of cortisol in traders,
Coates and Herbert (2008) also measured level of testosterone, an
androgen steroid hormone. The authors found that individuals
with a higher average level of the hormone tended to generate
more proﬁt in ﬁnancial transactions. Although testosterone level
has been positively associated with high-risk behaviors, such as
aggressive violence, irresponsible sexual behavior, and drug abuse
(Middleman and Durant, 1996), little research has focused on
economic risk. One of the larger and better-controlled studies
was conducted by Stanton et al. (2011), involving 154 participants
performing the Iowa Gambling Task, used to assess people’s
willingness to take risks. In the task, participants select cards
from four diﬀerent decks, which diﬀer in terms of the chances
of ﬁnancial rewards and penalties. Participants provided saliva
samples, which were analyzed for endogenous testosterone by
radioimmunoassay. The results indicated that individuals with
a high level of testosterone tended to take greater risks than
those people with low testosterone, with the relationship between
testosterone and risk-taking similar between men and women.
Although no gender diﬀerences in risk preference/aversion were
found in this study, the bulk of studies have tended to ﬁnd that
men are less averse to risk than women.
A review by Croson and Gneezy (2009) showed that men tend
to make riskier decisions in situations where risk is ﬁnancial
and a meta-analysis of 150 studies of gender diﬀerences in risk
behavior by Byrnes et al. (1999) found that men were signiﬁcantly
more likely to make risky decisions in a wide variety of risk-
relevant types of behavior. While endogenous testosterone is
argued to augment risk-taking in a transitory manner, it has
also been proposed that testosterone can have a more permanent
impact on brain development in utero (Arnold and Breedlove,
1985). Some researchers have used the ratio of the length of
the second and fourth ﬁngers, known as the 2D:4D ratio, as a
marker of the level, or at least eﬀects, of prenatal testosterone
(Manning, 2002). In contrast to the eﬀects of plasma testosterone
at any particular point in time, there is a clear causal, rather
than merely correlational, interpretation of any link between
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2D:4D ratio and ﬁnancially risky behavior, because this ratio
is ﬁxed prior to birth (McIntyre et al., 2005) and therefore
cannot be inﬂuenced by risky behavior in adulthood. Coates
et al. (2009) studied the ﬁnancial performance of a group of
male traders and found that lower 2D:4D ratios, reﬂecting higher
prenatal exposure to testosterone, made more money than those
with higher ratios. It should be noted, however, that greater
ﬁnancial returns are not necessarily indicative of greater risk-
taking (indeed, the opposite could be the case). Garbarino et al.
(2011) investigated links between 2D:4D ratio and risk-taking
directly, in a task involving ﬁnancial decisions. The authors found
that both men and women with lower 2D:4D ratios tended to
make riskier choices. Furthermore, they argued that the 2D:4D
ratio could partially account for gender diﬀerences in risk-taking.
Intriguingly, there is also evidence thatmen’s risk-taking behavior
can be modulated by the presence of women, in a way that
appears to depend on prenatal exposure to testosterone: Van den
Bergh and Dewitte (2006) found that men with lower 2D:4D
ratios, in the presence of women, became more impulsive by
selecting less desirable ﬁnancial outcomes. However, the behavior
of men with higher 2D:4D ratios was not altered by female
presence.
Oxytocin, outlined above, has also been implicated as a
modulator of risk behavior. Zak et al. (2007), using a double-
blind design, administered 34 males with intranasal oxytocin
and 34 males were given placebo. Participants played two
games: the ultimatum game and the dictator game, in randomly
formed dyads of Decision-maker 1 or Decision-maker 2. In the
ultimatum game, Decision-maker 1 was allotted $10 and asked
to oﬀer a split of the money to Decision-maker 2; if Decision-
maker 2 accepted the oﬀer, the money was divided between them
as per the split, but if he rejected it then no money was paid
at all. In the role of Decision-maker 2, participants were asked
to state the minimum acceptable oﬀer. A generous oﬀer was
deﬁned as one that was greater than required for acceptance. In
the dictator game, the structure was similar to the ultimatum
game, but Decision-maker 2 had no choice but to accept the
oﬀer by Decision-maker 1. This game was included to give a
measure of altruism (by people in the role of Decision-maker 1),
so that it could be dissociated from generosity in the ultimatum
game. Participants given oxytocin were 80% more generous than
those given placebo in the ultimatum game, but were no more
altruistic in the dictator game. The authors note that this increase
in generosity resembled an increase risk aversion: people in the
role of Decision-maker 1 may have made more generous oﬀers to
reduce the chance of being rejected and ending up with nothing.
CHOICE PREFERENCES AND
REGULATORY POLICY
Normative models of decision-making such as expected utility
theory suggest that decision-makers should make choices in
order to maximize utility (Von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1947). The assumption that decision-makers follow rational
normative assumptions, however, has been refuted frequently in
the literature (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Decision-makers
have been shown, instead, to divert from utility maximization
due to the inﬂuences from decision context, content, experience
and emotions (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Hertwig et al.,
2004; Kusev et al., 2009). Moreover, even once a choice is made,
decision-makers are still vulnerable. For example, in a study
employing a sleight-of-hand (a choice paradigm which permits
the experimenter to surreptitiously manipulate the relationship
between the choice and outcome that participants experience),
participants shifted their political voting intentions (Hall et al.,
2013). Respondents were asked to state their voting intention,
and introduced to a political survey of wedge issues between
two political coalitions. Using sleight-of-hand, voting intention
replies were altered and placed in the opposite political coalition
and participants were invited to reason about the manipulated
wedge issues. Remarkably, participants detected no more than
22% of the manipulated replies.
The need to protect decision-makers by legislation is evident.
Due to the vulnerability and fragility of choice preferences,
it is essential that consumers are protected by legislation not
only from explicit deception but also from decision subtleties,
context, and content. In this section, we shall brieﬂy explore
and evaluate aspects of European ﬁnancial legislation, directives,
and communications regarding both consumer protection and
ﬁnancial education, in relation to decision-making theory.
The Consumer Credit Directive (European Parliament, 2008)
sets out to standardize information given regarding consumer
credits. One normative aspect in this document is about
advertising regulations regarding credit products. They must
contain information about the interest rate, credit amount, and
the annual percentage rate (APR). Whilst APR incorporates
additional costs rather than just representing the borrowing
rate, the two are closely comparable, due to the fact that they
are represented and communicated in percentages. It is well
established in decision-making research (e.g., Newall and Love,
2015) that consumers experience diﬃculties comprehending
interest information, which is an issue given that credit products
are typically communicated in percentages.
Similarly, the Integration of European Mortgage Credit
Markets communication (European Parliament, 2007)
is designed to facilitate an ‘increasing product diversity’
which is expected to ‘improve consumer conﬁdence.’ This
communication implies that more decision options are
beneﬁcial to the consumers – “...having a complete range of
mortgage products...” (European Parliament, 2007). However,
theorists have argued that decision-makers cannot perform
multi-attribute decisions from the available options in the
context (Huber et al., 1982; Simonson, 1989). Accordingly,
empirical research has revealed that a choice between three
decision options (e.g., three diﬀerent credit products) each
one spaced on two decision attributes (e.g., borrowing rate
and APR) induced decision errors. For example, in their
choice, consumers will always select only between two decision
options on a single attribute – choosing the option with
the highest utility on this attribute (and ignoring any other
available attributes in the context), which is not necessarily the
option with the highest utility overall. Moreover, even decision
experts such as physicians are unable to overcome contextual
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decision biases. Redelmeier and Shaﬁr (1995) found that
additional choice options (number of medications) decreased the
likelihood of prescribing medication and increased the likelihood
of sending the patients to hip replacement surgery.
Both the Distance Contracts for Financial Services legislation
(European Parliament, 2002a) and the EU Consumer Rights
Directive (European Parliament, 2011) enforce consumers ‘Right
to withdraw,’ giving the consumers 14 days opportunity window
to withdraw from a ﬁnancial contract. Whilst this appears to
protect consumers allowing them to evaluate their needs once in
possession of the item, there are, however, psychological factors at
play that may bias the utility valuation of a product once owned.
For example, the Endowment Eﬀect reveals that possession of an
item increases its perceived value (Kahneman et al., 1990).
The endowment eﬀect is not only limited purely to
experimental settings, but has been shown to aﬀect trading on
a grand scale within the Australian stock exchange – traders
overvalued their stock portfolios (Johnstone and Furche, 2006).
Whilst returning an item is possible and supported by the
legislation, it is unlikely to happen as its perceived value will
increase due to possession.
The Insurance Brokerage directive (European Parliament,
2002b) proposes that only ﬁnancially capable should people
act as insurance intermediaries. Yet, as outlined in this article,
even those who make decisions professionally are susceptible to
behavioral biases (Johnstone and Furche, 2006).
However, some legislations accommodate behavioral science
knowledge. The EU Consumer Rights Directive (European
Parliament, 2011) aims to ensure the fair treatment of consumers
when purchasing goods or services. This directive bans pre-ticked
boxes for additional goods or services online. Thus protecting
consumers from unintended purchases of goods and services.
The directive addresses the Default Eﬀect – a tendency for
decision-makers to remain with a default option, rather than
switch preferences (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003).
SUMMARY
According to normative theory, any information that is
not directly used to calculate the expected values of the
decision options should not inﬂuence the choices. However,
variables such as diﬀerences in contextual descriptions of
risk, monetary amounts, and – importantly, as we have
shown – accessibility to decision-making content (e.g., activated
emotions) change risk preferences and choices (e.g., Kusev
et al., 2009). There is strong empirical support for the
eﬀects of emotions on risky behavior (e.g., Guven, 2012).
People are not slaves to their emotions, however, with
emotional regulation strategies associated having eﬀects on
aﬀective, social and cognitive functioning, and psychological
well-being (John and Gross, 2004). There are several key
hormonal correlates and determinants of risk. Cortisol,
testosterone, and oxytocin have been demonstrated to be
causally involved in modulating risky behavior. Chronic
sustained elevation of cortisol serves to make people more
risk averse, whereas both administered and naturally high
testosterone increases risky behavior. Oxytocin appears to
increase generosity in a manner resembling risk-aversion,
but more study is needed to add conﬁdence to this
interpretation. The inﬂuence of cognitive, emotional, and
hormonal factors and their interaction on decision-making
have implications for regulation to improve people’s decision-
making.
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